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in the 1990s 
Marshall Wolfe* 
This article gives a broad overview of the social 
structures on which democracy will have to be based 
in the 1990s. These structures continue to be hetero-
geneous, and the crisis has made them more unsta-
ble, as previous aspirations are falling by the wayside 
and most of the groups are living in conditions of 
greater insecurity and poverty, although some new 
possibilities of upward mobility are emerging, even 
among the most seriously marginated strata. The 
political parties and movements are in a process of 
evolution and are unsure of the forces they will be 
called on to represent and the validity of their tradi-
tional ideologies; for the most part, however, they 
have attained a higher level of realism and a willing-
ness to temporize with a view to the consolidation of 
broad social pacts at the cost of a reduction in their 
aspirations and an inability to offer their followers 
an inspiring mythology. 
The State is subject to tensions in three 
respects: as the symbol and permanent focal point of 
the national community; as the apparatus or public 
sector which has to fulfil a wide range of services and 
regulatory functions for society; and as a function of 
the credibility of the democratically elected political 
régimes which, ¡t is assumed, will give concrete form 
to the ideal attributes of the State and will run its 
institutions and the public administration to that 
end. 
The democratic régimes must convince society 
that they are capable of offering a real alternative 
which will lead to higher levels of well-being and 
equity. The most promising way of achieving this 
would appear to be free and rational political deliber-
ation which accepts that there is a constant tension 
between the principle of democratic uncertainty and 
the legitimate effort to give the politica! process 
coherence and a sense of utility. 
•Former Director of the ECLAC Social Development 
Division. 
I 
The present challenge to 
pluralist democracy* 
During the past half century the peoples of Latin 
America have experienced accelerating changes 
in their lifestyles and in their interactions with 
national societies, the State and the international 
order. Within a few years, overwhelmingly rural 
societies became predominantly urban, and the 
urban as well as the rural environments were 
transformed too. New opportunities for liveli-
hood opened up in industry and services, 
although in most countries they did not keep 
pace with the growth and increasing spatial 
mobility of the labour force. A heterogeneous 
"urban informal sector", variously labelled and 
interpreted, expanded and diversified to fill the 
gap. Most of the young people gained access to at 
least rudimentary schooling, and entry into 
higher education became an uncontrollable 
flood. Mass communication media and "mod-
ern" consumption aspirations reached most of 
the population. Emigration to the United States 
and Europe became an increasingly accessible 
alternative for members of different classes with 
diverse motives. Interactions with public 
bureaucracies in their servicing, subsidizing, reg-
ulating and repressive functions became criti-
cally important to people who had previously 
had little or no direct contact with the State. 
Political participation repeatedly waxed and 
waned, with cycles of mobilization under popu-
list auspices followed by frustration and forced 
demobilization. Intergenerational changes 
became so great that the experience of one gen-
eration lost relevance as a guide for the next. 
Many studies have documented these 
changes and emphasized the difficulties they 
imply for the formation of classes with 
consistent political behaviour and expectations, 
for social cohesion, or for the achievement of 
hegemony by any agents trying to mobilize 
support for projects corresponding to broad 
national interests (see, for example, 
"In writing the present version of this article, the author 
received the kind comments of so many member of ECLAC that it is 
impossible to thank them all individually. 
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Pensamiento Iberoamericano, No. 6, 1984; 
Labastida and del Campo, 1985; and Touraine, 
1987). The changes were notoriously conflicrive 
and inequitable, continually disrupting the 
expectations and allegiances of different groups. 
The political responses were to a large extent 
clientelistic or corporative, designed to protect 
individual or group interests irrespective of 
wider repercussions. The failure of State policies 
—whatever their pretensions— to overcome the 
marginalization or exclusion of large parts of the 
national populations became increasingly 
obvious. Nevertheless, up to the 1970s in some 
countries and the early 1980s in others, the 
changes proceeded in a context of economic 
expansion that enabled some groups to make 
major gains in incomes and status, encouraged 
others to hope for future gains, and permitted 
the State to expand social services and 
consumption subsidies of various kinds to the 
urban majority and to a lesser extent to much of 
the rural population. The gap between income 
levels of the rich and poor widened; the poor 
encountered new forms of insecurity and 
exploitation; urban concentration made poverty 
more visible; but for the most part poverty did 
not seem to become more extreme nor more 
prevalent. ECLAC and other institutions 
continued to criticize the real processes of 
growth and change from the standpoint of 
criteria of social injustice and squandering of 
human potentialities, warned of future 
contradictions, and proposed alternative, more 
equitable and more dynamic development styles 
and policies. Government declarations and plans 
along similar lines proliferated. However, the 
capacity of the forces dominating the processes 
to continue on their own terms and overcome 
political and economic threa ts seemed 
increasingly to rule out major structural reforms 
aiming at greater equity, whether through 
democrat ic or technocra t ic -author i ta r ian 
procedures. 
Since then, social structures and the 
positions of individuals in them have continued 
to change as dynamically and contradictorily as 
before, but in a context of economic stagnation, 
declining levels of living, declining State capacity 
to respond to needs and demands, marked 
insecurity concerning livelihood, concentration 
of attention on individual and group survival 
strategies, and perplexity or pessimism 
concerning the feasibility of any national policy 
for overcoming a crisis that has persisted for 
nearly a decade or even longer, depending on the 
country. 
Pluralist democracy, in the sense of freely 
elected governments, has re-emerged in Latin 
America precisely when economic and social 
structural conditions for its exercise seem at 
their worst. This is due partly to the increasingly 
effective and broadly-based repudiation of 
authoritarian régimes, but partly also to the wil-
lingness of the forces dominating such régimes 
to leave to others the onus of coping with the 
crisis. It is more surprising that pluralist demo-
cracy has managed to survive and to some extent 
consolidate itself under these conditions. It is a 
truism that democratic participation and policies 
responding to popular demands are more feasi-
ble when an economy is expanding, so that the 
poor can gain without serious inconvenience to 
the rich and the State can capture a higher pro-
portion of the national income for redistributive 
purposes. Latin American régimes took only 
limited advantage of this possibility before the 
crisis, and certainly never convinced the rich of 
its virtues, but since then ability to tax according 
to ability to pay has fallen sharply, and ability to 
use revenues for social purposes even more so. 
Throughout the 1980s the democratically elected 
régimes have vacillated between austerity poli-
cies that intensify poverty and undercut their 
own legitimacy, and heterodox initiatives that 
collapse because of insufficient control over the 
whole range of relevant factors and actors. 
Stable democratic systems call for the pres-
ence of political parties with broad support, 
expressing coherent interests of classes or 
groups but disposed to enter into realistic com-
promises and restrain their followers. They also 
call for a wide range of sectoral and local organi-
zations interacting with the State, making 
demands on it and defending their members 
against its excesses, but at the same time reliev-
ing the State of responsibilities that it cannot 
meet with tolerable efficiency and flexibility. 
The present fluidities, contradictions and inse-
curities throughout the social structures make 
the emergence and consolidation of such requi-
sites for democracy even more problematic than 
before. 
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At the same time, the failures of the 
military-authoritarian and one-sidedly market-
oriented regimes to cope with the crisis, and the 
simultaneous loss of credibility of the "real 
Socialist" model have given pluralist democracy 
a breathing space. No plausible alternative for 
the ordering of public choices is in sight, and the 
most likely outcome if democratic regimes fail is 
disintegration of the social and political 
structures into anomic "wars of all against 
all" —of which ominous symptoms are visible 
in some countries. Partisans of democracy can 
take grim comfort in Winston Churchill's 
maxim: "Democracy is the worst system of 
government— except for all the others". 
Pluralist democracy probably cannot remain 
indefinitely restricted to electoral choices 
between parties or coalitions, with the reality of 
the choice negated by the inability of the 
resulting régime to escape from crisis 
management and from multiple vetoes exercised 
by economic élites, the military, and lending 
agencies. The next question to ask ourselves is 
whether the public debate and freedom of 
organi2ation associated with the present stage 
can lead to broader democratization of the 
societies and greater innovativeness in 
overcoming the seemingly insuperable 
obstacles. 
The crisis of the 1980s and the authoritarian 
excesses that preceded it have transformed intel-
lectual discourse on politics in Latin America. 
The researches and debates suggest the follow-
ing unavoidably oversimplified evaluation of the 
different collective actors or components of the 
social structures in relation to the prospects for 
pluralist democracy:1 
'Ghai and Hewitt de Alcántara (1989) present particularly 
interesting hypotheses on present directions of change indifferent 
social classes, some of which have been introduced in the following 
pages. 
Attention has turned from explanations of the 
inevitability of authoritarianism or of revolution 
to means of making democracy more viable and 
more relevant to the needs and cultures of the 
participants. Spokesmen for different schools 
have become more disposed to listen to each 
other and to seek common ground. Dogmatism 
and exclusivist utopias have receded. The 
"hyper-autonomy of the cultural actors" noted 
by Alain Touraine (1987, pp. 118-124) has 
become somewhat more restrained and the 
"professional critical tendency" has gained over 
the "committed prophetic tendency". 
Researchers have contributed to a picture of the 
relationships of social structures, cultural influ-
ences and political behaviour which is more con-
vincing and assimilable by public opinion than 
before. Regional forums for debate and institu-
tional settings for political as well as social and 
economic research have become stronger in 
spite of the scarcity of resources. The prolifera-
tion of essays citing each other and examining 
democracy in the light of an international arse-
nal of social and political theory might leave an 
impression of intellectual élites interacting with 
each other. However, parts of the discourse are 
penetrating the mass media and the visions of 
political leaders, while some political theorists 
have entered the political arena with considera-
ble success (the bibliography lists several collec-
tions of essays and research reports on this 
subject). 
1. Economic élites 
Changes among the groups previously dominant 
in the economies and societies have been diverse, 
but the elements best able to cope with the crisis 
have been those who are least identified with 
production for the domestic market and are in a 
position to protect themselves against inflation 
as well as taxation by keeping their resources in 
hard currencies abroad and by investing flexibly 
II 
Changes in social structures and the 
precariousness of social cohesion 
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at high interest rates or by affiliating with trans-
national enterprises. In some countries, the drug 
traffic has also become a notorious source of 
direct and indirect gains which greatly exceed 
those to be had from legitimate enterprises and 
are moreover impervious to the crisis. These 
groups have been able to increase their con-
sumption, largely of imported goods, in the 
midst of shortages of foreign exchange and 
impoverishment of the majority. The streng-
thening of such economic elites, whose interests 
and cultural standards are transnational, 
obviously clashes with the consolidation of plu-
ralist democracy in countries with open and basi-
cally capitalist economies. Their lifestyles are a 
provocation to the rest of the population (in the 
double sense of a stimulus to consumeríst imita-
tion and an irritant) and a major factor behind 
insufficient national ability to accumulate and 
invest. They are not disposed to make sacrifices 
for the national interest, whether because of 
skepticism concerning the efficacy of govern-
ment policies or indifference to the general wel-
fare. In general, they intervene in politics 
through intermediaries rather than as open con-
tenders for office, and their political purposes 
combine shrinkage of the State's role with use of 
State power to protect their immediate interests. 
The nature and location of their assets prevent 
the State from taxing them or, as a last resort, 
expropriating them, as could be done in the case 
of landholdings and industries. The inducements 
they would require to repatriate their wealth and 
invest in production might be too high for a 
democratic State to offer. 
Of course, this is not the whole story. Impor-
tant components of the economic élites would 
benefit from strengthening of domestic markets 
and from social cohesion supporting stable 
expectations, and they have shown considerable 
dynamism in expanding and diversifying export 
production. Many export-oriented entrepre-
neurs are just as interested in mutually suppor-
tive relationships with the State as have been the 
industrialists seeking protected domestic 
markets, and are not captivated by neoliberal 
ideology. Compatibilization of their basic inter-
ests with those of other groups through the 
political process is feasible in principle, and this 
objective underlies the recurrent efforts at social 
pacts. The content of the bargains that might be 
struck depends too much on differing national 
situations and on the capacity of the State for it 
to be discussed here. For the present, unfortu-
nately, the fact that major resource owners are 
partly divorced from national interests and pol-
icy decisions, in combination with the debt 
burden, can practically paralyze the capacity of 
democratic régimes to respond to popular 
demands. 
2. Middle strata 
Some groups among the middle strata have been 
able to cope with their problems through indi-
vidualistic strategies similar to those of the 
élites, or through emigration outside the region. 
A good many professionals and managers, start-
ing with some capital and relevant experience, 
have been able to start successful small busi-
nesses. Particularly among the salaried middle 
strata, however, the general trend seems to have 
been toward greater insecurity, shrinking 
incomes, and a widening gap between realities 
and the expectations of modernized consump-
tion and upward intergenerational mobility that 
became entrenched during the years of economic 
expansion. During the 1950s and 1960s many 
observers looked on the rise of the middle strata 
with excessive complacency as a basis for demo-
cratic progress. This view was followed by prob-
ably excessive deprecation as the real middle 
strata, impelled by the educational system and 
the mass media toward public employment and 
consumerism, found themselves pushed into 
authoritarianism by manipulated fears of popu-
list or socialist mobilization of the masses. They 
are now left stranded by the "concentrating and 
excluding" style of development proposed as the 
way out of the crisis. 
Pluralist democracy can hardly survive with-
out the active participation of major elements in 
the middle strata and at least the passive accep-
tance of, the remainder. The intellectual groups 
creating and disseminating the present discourse 
on democracy belong mainly to these strata. A 
key question is whether, and to what extent, the 
middle strata will be able to keep within bounds 
their predisposition to seek particularist advan-
tages from democratic political systems. This 
predisposition must have been intensified by 
their present plight and their fears of any 
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downward redistribution of incomes and State 
services, since the State finds it easier to curb 
their entitlements than those of the rich. 
For present purposes, one component of the 
middle straca deserves special attention, namely, 
that which embraces the technocrats, profes-
sionals and bureaucrats in the public sector; they 
will be discussed again below, in relation to the 
capacities of the State. Up to the 1970s, in differ-
ent countries, they were among the most vigor-
ously growing components of the middle strata, 
and the main source of employment for the 
rising output of graduates from the universities. 
Political purges and debureaucratization cam-
paigns periodically change their composition at 
the higher levels and introduce insecurity, but 
have not stopped their overall expansion. Dur-
ing the 1980s they have in most countries main-
tained their numbers or even increased them, in 
spite of the State's shrinking resources, but at the 
price of sharp reductions in their incomes and 
declining working conditions (Tokman, 1982, 
pp. 413 and 414). This naturally generates neg-
lect of official duties, corruption, and a search for 
additional sources of income that amounts to a 
kind of "informalization". It also strengthens 
corporative self-defensive propensities, as polit-
ical regimes and public opinion sharpen old ste-
reotypes of public employees as a burden, an 
oversized, over-expensive and unresponsive 
instrument for providing services or accomp-
lishing State policies. This situation motivates 
public employees to try to strengthen alliances 
with clienteles in the societies, but such alliances 
require the ability to provide real services to the 
clienteles, and this ability is now quite weak. 
The higher-level professionals or techno-
crats in the State apparatus face somewhat dif-
ferent contradictions and sources of insecurity, 
along with the general lack of resources to carry 
out the policies they are supposed to be adminis-
tering. Their self-confidence, together with the 
confidence of the political leadership in their 
expertise, have presumably been weakened by 
the crisis and their previous inability to foresee 
or forestall it, but the State's dependence on 
expertise to manage the crisis has become 
greater than ever before. 
Even if the bureaucracies can protect their 
levels of employment, they can no longer absorb 
much of the output of higher education, and this 
presents additional unknown factors for the 
future of democracy. During the 1980s, student 
movements have shown relative restraint in tak-
ing advantage of the opening of democratic free-
doms that followed the extreme repression to 
which many of them were exposed during the 
1970s. However, it is not at all clear what their 
longer-term response will be to a blocking of 
aspirations to upward mobility, combined with 
waning of the revolutionary utopias that 
inspired many of their predecessors in the uni-
versities. One probable consequence for the 
minority of youth able to enter private universi-
ties offering higher-quality professional educa-
tion would be a greater propensity to seek 
opportunities abroad, thus contributing to the 
transnationalization of the better-off. For the 
majority, whose qualifications have in any case 
been devalued by the deterioration and over-
crowding of the public and cheaper private uni-
versities, the prospect is for a kind of 
marginalization through improvised self-
employment or low-paid jobs in commercial or 
other services, and possibly for a new wave of 
participation in social movements of the disad-
vantaged. Past experience shows that such par-
ticipation can be both invigorating and 
disruptive for the movements and the demo-
cratic political system. 
3. Urban wage workers 
Industrial and related workers have undergone 
shocks even more severe than those experienced 
by the salaried components of the middle strata, 
combining material losses in incomes and levels 
of consumption with intensified insecurity con-
cerning their place in society and their future 
prospects. The drastic cuts in real wages of up to 
50% and the static or declining numbers 
employed in modern industries in the context of 
a continually growing urban labour force are well 
known. The dividing line between such wage 
workers and the "informal sector', never entirely 
clearcut, has become even more indistinct. 
Working-class families have had to combine 
multiple sources of income, including various 
forms of self-employment; women and children 
have had to contribute to family livelihood by 
taking whatever opportunities offered 
themselves. 
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The ability of most trade unions to protect 
their members' interests and intervene in 
national policy-making, after partial recovery 
from the repression suffered during the 1970s, 
has declined along with the numbers of workers 
in occupations that were previously strongholds 
of militant unionism. The most dramatic case is 
the eclipse of the Bolivian miners —core of a 
union movement that since the 1950s could 
often challenge the State itself— as a result of 
the decline in employment in the State mining 
corporation,from more than p. 32). 
Probably just as important for assessment of 
the prospects for pluralist democracy has been 
the weakening of convictions concerning the 
"vanguard role" of the "proletariat". Up to the 
1980s, most of the ideologists and political party 
leaders claiming to represent the working class, 
along with much of the trade union leadership, 
assumed that this class would continue to grow 
in numbers, organizational strength and class 
consciousness, and eventually become the cen-
tral actor in a socialist transformation of the 
societies. "Developmentalists" also assumed an 
increasingly important role for the organized 
working class, without endorsing the revolution-
ary conclusion. The extent to which the working 
class itself internalized this outlook is not clear, 
but it has undoubtedly been a major source of 
hope and self-confidence. For the most past, the 
major working-class mobilizations in Latin 
America followed populist or corporative rather 
than socialist orientations. As Marxist interpre-
tations of the role of different classes and accep-
table class alliances changed and became more 
diverse, political usage of the term "proletarian" 
came to amount to little more than a label 
through which different factions of non-
proletarian intellectuals and activists asserted 
the correctness of their strategies. 
However, the conviction that the proletariat 
has a foreordained role and right to the central 
position in alliances has been an important con-
straint on the formation of coalitions of demo-
cratic political forces and on the capacity of class 
spokesmen to interact with organizations based 
on the middle strata or the peasants as allies with 
equal rights to shape policies. Present realities 
have disintegrated such exclusivisms. The highly 
visible difficulties of the "real Socialist" coun-
tries, which up to the 1980s offered plausible 
alternatives to a capitalist future and were some-
times direct mentors of working-class parties, 
have undermined previous dogmas. So have the 
t rends away from working-class self-
identification of the social democratic régimes of 
Western Europe. 
The overall implications for pluralist demo-
cracy are too contradictory and indeterminate for 
adequate discussion here, but several of the stu-
dies cited above have tackled them with the 
attention to national differences that they 
require. Some political leaders and ideologists, in 
the midst of very difficult situations and some-
times personal danger, are trying to rethink the 
lessons of the recent past and the future of the 
working class within settings so far removed 
from their previous expectations. Working-class 
organizations —unions as well as political 
parties— retain a considerable ability to mobil-
ize wider groups, including parts of the middle 
strata as well as the urban and rural poor, for 
mass protests against austerity policies and 
against denial of democratic rights. Their posi-
tion in the productive process continues to give 
them a greater propensity to broad organization 
and confrontation with major questions of eco-
nomic and social policy than other disadvan-
taged groups. Insecurity and the discrediting of 
past illusions do not necessarily mean the loss of 
convictions concerning the possibility of a juster 
social order, and if leadership proves equal to the 
challenge they might stimulate greater innova-
tiveness in pursuing this utopia. Closer approxi-
mation to the living conditions and survival 
strategies of the urban poor might result in a 
diffusion of organized working-class influence as 
well as the blurring of working-class identity. 
The crisis stimulates militancy along trade union 
lines in parts of the salaried middle strata, such 
as teachers and bank employees, as well as rap-
prochements with relatively new social move-
ments mobilizing women, ethnic groups, and 
environmentalists. 
4. The urban remainder 
When one comes to the rest of the urban popula-
tion (in some cases now the majority): the 
"poor", the "sub-proletariat", the "informal sec-
tor", the "marginalized", according to various 
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attempts to label and classify them —the numer-
ous sources of information and speculation 
remind one of the story of the blind man describ-
ing the elephant. These groups were hetero-
geneous before the crisis of the 1980s, and are 
more so now. The most general trend among 
them has undoubtedly been toward deeper 
impoverishment, as their numbers have 
increased, along with overcrowding in their set-
tlements, shrinking opportunities for wage 
labour, inflation outrunning incomes, and cur-
tailment of State services and subsidies. At the 
same time, they have become more complexly 
integrated into the economies and the political 
systems than before. At least in some settings 
they have displayed greater adaptability in their 
responses to crisis and in the local practice of 
democracy and reciprocity than have other com-
ponents of the population. The decline of pro-
duction in the "modern" consumer goods 
industries, of capacity to import, and of consu-
mer purchasing power have given more scope to 
small unregulated industries producing cheap 
goods for the domestic market, including the 
market within the informal sector itself. The 
same trends have probably motivated large 
enterprises, including some transnationals, to 
make more use of the informal sector for piece-
work production and for marketing of products 
through street vendors. And in a paradoxical 
seizing of new opportunities linking the most 
marginal strata with the most important new 
sources of capital accumulation, some groups 
have been able to rise out of poverty through 
participation in the drug traffic. 
The previous networks of neighbourhood 
self-help, which have a long and well-
documented history, have evolved and probably 
grown stronger under the spur of necessity, and 
have been helped toward greater self-confidence 
by various external allies. The reemergence of 
political democracy and competition for elec-
toral support, and in some cases participation 
with other classes in mass mobilizations against 
oppressive regimes, have enabled parts of the 
groups in question to make their needs heard 
and to relate themselves to national issues, after 
years of forced exclusion. 
These tendencies have encouraged some cur-
rents of opinion to detect the seeds of a new 
social and economic order, whether communit-
arian or individualist and market-guided, but in 
both cases freeing itself from domination by 
bureaucracies and also from discredited prescrip-
tions for "development". Some supporters of 
variants of this position have offered blueprints 
for progress calling for participation by a self-
restraining de-bureaucratized State inspired by 
new values and conceptions of development.2 
Others look rather to a withering away of the 
State, along with existing patterns of economic 
and social relationships, through the autonom-
ous evolution of social movements or a "new 
majority" and view the present crisis as a posi-
tive contribution to this process (Esteva, 1988 
and Quijano, 1988). 
For the present, no generalization can be 
made with confidence. All of the interpretations 
may have a limited validity, like the blind man's 
description of parts of the elephant. Among the 
urban poor, solidarity and anomic individualism 
will no doubt continue to coexist and evolve 
conflictively throughout the foreseeable future. 
As ín other social strata, authoritarian and cüen-
telistic cultural propensities will contend with 
strivings toward equity and self-determination. 
The communitarian anti-State prescriptions for 
direct democracy and reciprocity are likely to 
remain secondary (although politically relevant) 
influences in the evolution of the urban majori-
ties. Paternalistic-bureaucratic solutions to their 
problems will be neither effective nor compati-
ble with democratic values, but one cannot draw 
a consistent dividing line between such pseudo-
solutions and indispensable State support for 
basic services and measures to relieve critical 
poverty. The question then comes to the fore 
whether and how the heterogeneous urban 
lower strata can formulate and represent their 
interests in an organized way, negotiating with 
the State and other social groups so as to over-
come the extreme discrimination or exclusion 
they now experience. The present discussion 
will return to this question later. The urban 
majorities during the 1980s have shown more 
forbearance than might have been expected in 
the face of austerity policies applied by demo-
cratically elected regimes under external pres-
2
 Communitarian and market-oriented variants of blueprints 
addressed primarily to the State are represented, respectively, by 
Development Dialogue, No. 1 (1989) and de Soto (1987). 
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sure. Major outbreaks of violent protest have 
been few, considering the provocations. The 
fears current among the better-off urban strata, 
which see the poor as a menace of barbarism and 
chaos, have not been realized, although sharp 
rises in criminal behaviour, particularly among 
the youth, keep such fears alive. However, tangi-
ble reasons and means for the poor to support 
and participate in pluralist democracy at the 
national level cannot be delayed indefinitely. 
5. Peasants and rural workers 
The rural population has for some time been 
complexly linked to the urban one through the 
currents of migration, the penetration of mass 
communication media, and increasing 
dependence on national markets. These links 
have naturally undergone traumatic changes 
during the 1980s. Some groups of small 
landowners have gained through better terms of 
trade for domestic food products and more State 
support for peasant agriculture, but landless 
rural workers have generally lost, through 
higher food prices and greater competition for 
jobs. Cityward migration as an escape from rural 
poverty has become less attractive, although not 
enough to stop it. Remittances from migrants 
that previously subsidized many rural economies 
have probably dwindled, and reverse migration 
from the cities to the countryside has probably 
increased. 
Rural social organizations have in a good 
many cases revived or become better able to take 
advantage of democratic openings, to enter into 
political alliances, and to negotiate with the 
State. Peasants and rural workers are now 
dealing with export-oriented agricultural 
entrepreneurs and commercial intermediaries 
quite different from the traditional landlords, 
although not in general less exploitative or 
readier to concede bargaining rights. The old 
unresolved issues of land monopolization and 
tenure reform reappear in new settings, as 
landless peasants move into the tropical interior 
and contend with large exploitative enterprises 
as well as with the previous inhabitants. Even 
forest-dwelling tribes, until now the most 
defenceless of the rural groups, have become 
able to find external allies and make their 
grievances heard internationally as well as 
nationally. To a large extent (albeit with obvious 
differences within and between countries) rural 
isolation and unchallenged domination by 
landowners and caciques has been superseded. 
On balance, however, the 1980s have brought 
rural people in much of Latin America even 
greater insecurity and exposure to violence than 
heretofore. Attempts at organized and 
autonomous political participation still 
encounter intimidation by private as well as 
public armed forces, or degenerate into endless 
conflicts in which rural people become pawns of 
contending forces —guerrillas, drug traffickers, 
police and military— disrupting livelihood and 
community ties and practically depopulating 
some zones. Coca cultivation, through which 
peasants in some countries have raised both 
their incomes and their organizational 
solidarity, has notoriously become a major factor 
in the spread of intimidating violence. 
Throughout Latin America, the rural popu-
lation, while generally maintaining its absolute 
numbers, has become a minority in relation to 
the urban population. The prospects of incorpo-
rating rural groups —culturally or ethnically dis-
tinct and accustomed but not reconciled to 
exclusion from "national" affairs— into a plural-
ist democratic order is thus less formidable than 
it seemed in the past. The threat or promise of 
social transformation through peasant revolu-
tion has practically disappeared except in a very 
few countries. The rural population has become 
more integrated into the national societies, 
although this integration is on very disadvan-
tageous terms and is far from complete. Rural 
changes may continue to be more violently con-
flictive than urban ones, but the main immediate 
requisite for full rural participation in pluralist 
democracy is an effective and supportive State 
presence, offering means for conflict resolution 
other than the law of the strongest, as well as 
basic education and health services and help in 
coping with technological change and market 
relationships. This, of course, is what democratic 
governments have been aspiring to provide, and 
the general reduction of State resources and 
administrative capacities has probably affected 
their rural presence even more adversely than 
their other functions. 
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6. Social structural fluidity and 
democratic politics 
The groups or classes described above are now 
groping for political expression through parties 
and movements that are themselves experienc-
ing identity crises, in many cases emerging from 
years of repression, insecure as to the forces they 
can expect to represent and the relevance of 
their traditional ideologies. Leadership from the 
1950s and 1960s has to interact with young acti-
vists whose generation has experienced a simul-
taneous disintegration of expectations for 
insertion into employment and the continually 
changing impact of the international youth cul-
ture. The political parties have to incorporate or 
compete with new kinds of organized move-
How can the proponents of pluralist democracy, 
grappling with the fluidity of the social struc-
tures and of political organizations in settings of 
crisis, justify popular confidence in its future? 
Part of the answer must lie in a strengthening oí 
the State, a renewal of responsibility for tasks 
that only the State can accomplish, and this very 
general proposition opens up one of the more 
polemical areas of political discourse. A discus-
sion of the responsibilities of the State in rela-
tion to the questions discussed above must try to 
keep in balance three different dimensions of the 
"State": 
1. The State as symbol of nationhood 
As the permanent expression of a national polit-
ical community, the State demands the loyalty of 
members of the community, acts as final arbiter 
of class and group conflicts, monopolizes the 
legitimate use of force, etc., according to well-
known formulas. Ideally, in pluralist democra-
cies majorities would decide what the State 
should do or refrain from doing, within gener-
ally accepted and codified rules protecting the 
rights of minorities. In Latin America the State 
ments seeking to achieve priority for protection 
of the environment, the rights of women, or the 
legitimacy of minority cultures. In the effort to 
put together majority coalitions the parties are 
forming combinations that would have been 
unthinkable in the recent past, but the resulting 
majorities are inevitably precarious. The com-
petitive introduction of sophisticated marketing 
techniques makes electoral choices more confus-
ing or illusory. The conjuncture is no doubt stim-
ulating greater realism and innovativeness in 
parts of the political leadership. However to the 
extent to which the crisis forces this leadership, 
once in office, to apply policies repugnant to its 
values and promises, it generates extremely 
unstable electoral behaviour, with votes express-
ing mainly repudiation rather than preference. 
has historically asserted wide autonomy in rela-
tion to society, extending even to State manipu-
lation or creation of collective social actors, but it 
has been paradoxically weak in representative-
ness and accepted hegemony. Attempts to 
mobilize the "nation" behind the State have con-
tributed to populism and the aggrandizement of 
the military as symbol of the nation and guaran-
tor of the State. In Latin America, the State has 
gained strength in recent decades through the 
weakening or elimination of local power centres 
and oligarchies and, more ambivalently, through 
widening expectations in most of the population 
that solutions to problems of livelihood and pro-
tection against injustice depend on the State.5 
The processes of democratization have streng-
thened State legitimacy and the failures of popu-
lism and military authoritarianism have 
generated some degree of immunization against 
temptations to advance minority interests 
through capture and voluntarist manipulation of 
the State. 
3
 Cardoso (1984), p. 28 et seq., discusses the strength of these 
expectations and the contradictions in them. 
HI 
The State and democracy 
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At the same time, the State as the expression 
of nationhood is threatened from two directions. 
Internally, social structural mutations during 
and before the crisis, with shocks to previous 
expectations and the emergence of new oppor-
tunities for advancement divorced from or con-
trary to the legal framework and the general 
welfare, have made relations between the State 
and society more contradictory and precarious. 
Externally, the State has become more vis-
ibly dependent not only on the vicissitudes of the 
world economic order but also on the direct 
dictates of the international lending agencies. As 
was indicated above, parts of the élites have 
become more "transnationaüzed" both ideologi-
cally and in their material interests, prepared to 
transfer their funds and their expertise if 
national prospects are unpropitious or govern-
ment policies affect them adversely. Even move-
ments focussed on social, cultural, human rights 
and ecological questions have become dependent 
on transnational circuits. These circuits have 
also become critically important —as sources of 
funds, forums for interchange of ideas, and 
refuges from repression— to participants in pol-
itical research as well as political action. 
Altogether, confidence in the nation-State is 
eroding under the suspicion that such States, 
whatever their leadership or policies, are becom-
ing irrelevant or impotent. In its impact on the 
credibility of the State the crisis has meant more 
than a loss of 10 years of "development" or 
reversion to the level of the early 1970s. While 
the better-established nation-States of Europe 
have been able to respond to new challenges by 
closer union the States of Latin America have 
seemed unable to do so, beyond the level of 
rhetoric and conferences. One reason has been 
the uneasy coexistence of formally democratic 
States side by side with those controlled by 
authoritarian regimes, with the former implic-
itly questioning the legitimacy of the latter, and 
the latter affirming their legitimacy by resorting 
to traditional national rivalries. The present pre-
dominance of pluralist democratic régimes 
should make closer union possible as well as 
necessary, but obviously a great deal needs to be 
done before this can shore up the credibility of 
the State as an effective expression of political 
community. 
2. The State as "public sector" 
States constitute aggregations of institutions and 
bureaucracies with their own forces of inertia 
and momentum. Up to the 1980s, public sector 
institutions in most countries, in spite of politi-
cal purges and other vicissitudes, were gradually 
becoming "modernized", entrusted with wider 
responsibilities, and staffed by better-qualified 
functionaries. The enhanced capacity of the pub-
lic sector to manage the economy and provide 
social services was commonly pointed to as one 
of the more positive aspects of "development", a 
means of making this disorderly process more 
dynamic and more harmonious in the future. It 
became evident, however, that even under 
authoritarian régimes parts of the State appara-
tus were becoming increasingly detached from 
central control. They evolved their own tech-
niques for self-defence and expansion, and 
became more closely linked to interest groups in 
the private sector or to external interlocutors 
(governments, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, transnational enterprises, professional 
peer groups) than to the State as arbiter of 
national policy (Martins, 1984 and Graciarena, 
1984). The educational upgrading of public 
employment became entangled with its inflation 
in order to absorb the output of the universities. 
In the fragmented autonomization of the State 
apparatus the military became even more of a 
special case than before, with their own political 
culture and conception of the State and their 
unrivalled capacity to impose their own criteria 
on the State and society. 
With the crisis of the 1980s and the shrin-
kage of public resources, governments, whatever 
their policy stance, cannot afford the bureaucra-
cies they have acquired piecemeal. Thus they 
cannot avoid striving to make the State appara-
tus less costly, more flexible, more responsive to 
central directives as well as to democratic princi-
ples, and more concentrated on major imme-
diate needs rather than spread over a 
multiplicity of programmes originating in 
separate past initiatives. Simplification of regu-
lations and controls in order to stimulate private 
initiative and reduce the costs of the "nursemaid 
State" is obviously desirable but hard to achieve 
in the midst of crisis and conflicting demands. 
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Democratic régimes cannot afford to reduce 
public employment drastically in the face of the 
plight of the middle strata, but neither can they 
afford to maintain salaries and resources so that 
the public services can meet their responsibili-
ties. The result, as was stated above, has been 
demoralization and "survival strategies" among 
public functionaries that further discredit State 
authority. 
3. State and régime 
Lastly, one comes to the government or political 
régime as the expression of dominant forces in 
the society or of a compromise between different 
forces, expected to convert into reality the ideal 
attributes of the State and harness the public 
sector institutions and bureaucracies for this 
purpose. Many studies in Latin America and 
elsewhere have demonstrated how governments 
are hampered in these tasks by the traits of the 
State apparatus, the nature of political support 
or resistances from within the societies, and 
their own ideologically biassed versions of real-
ity. "Expert" advice on what must be done, and 
how it should be carried out, invariably exceeds 
the political leadership's ability to digest, select, 
and act on it. Democratic leadership, in particu-
lar, must continually try to balance contradictory 
principles for action; to feel and inspire confi-
dence in the correctness of its policies while 
remaining open to criticism; to seek policy con-
sistency while being prepared to compromise so 
as to broaden political support; and to undertake 
urgently needed and controversial actions while 
respecting rules of the game that enable adver-
saries to block or distort such actions. If the 
political leadership accepts the full implications 
of pluralist democracy it must also accept per-
manent uncertainty as to the outcome of its 
policies and their endorsement by the society.4 
At present, the contradiction between political 
4
 "Democracy means that all groups must subject their 
interests to uncertainty. It is this very act of alienation of control 
over outcomes of conflicts that constitutes the decisive step toward 
democracy. If one set of policies is seen as superior for the welfare 
of the society and this set of policies is assumed to be known, then it 
seems irrational to introduce uncertainty as to whether this set of 
policies will be chosen. Even in an economic crisis, when the 
economic policy of a particular government is recognized to have 
conformism or realism in the sense of recogni-
tion of narrow constraints on State action, on the 
one hand, and apprehension that major changes 
in economic policy and the role of the State 
cannot be evaded, on the other, is particularly 
acute. A number of object-lessons throughout 
the world have demonstrated the depths of eco-
nomic chaos and political ungovernability to 
which countries can fall either through evasion 
of choices or through voluntarist strategies that 
disregard limited control of relevant factors. 
A few principles for State action within a 
pluralist emocratic framework can be proposed.5 
heir applicability obviously depends on confron-
tation with ational peculiarities, potentialities 
and constraints. All of hem imply political costs 
as well as benefits and contain possibilities for 
perverse results: 
a) Restraint and choice in State interventions 
Strengthening of the State requires self-
limitation and simplification of its interven-
tions. The struggle to accomplish this may in 
itself strengthen the State by forcing the political 
leadership to assess the justifications and organ-
ized interests behind the whole range of State 
activities. Under present conditions, if demo-
cratic régimes do not undertake this effort, they 
face further loss of control over semi-
autonomous public institutions and further dete-
rioration in the quality of services to the public. 
The elimination of overlapping or contradictory 
regulating and permit-issuing functions of pub-
lic agencies (one of the main irritants in rela-
tions between the State and the public) would by 
itself strengthen the legitimacy of the State in 
enforcing regulations really needed to protect 
public health and safety. Moreover, restraint in 
State interventions is in keeping with promising 
initiatives for innovative co-operation emerging 
within the societies. 
been mistaken, some other policy always appears to authoritarian 
bureaucrats as uniquely destined to improve the situation. 
Recognition of past mistakes does not constitute a demonstration 
that the authoritarian system is inherently flawed but only that 
past mistakes must be corrected and a new, proper policy must be 
followed." (Przeworski (1986), pp. 60-61.) 
'Principles and pitfalls for democratic regimes are discussed 
in more detail in Wolfe (1985). 
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At the same time, this desideratum con-
fronts contradictions with democratically 
expressed demands and convictions concerning 
social rights, as well as less legitimate clientelist, 
corporative and bureaucratic tactics that are 
entangled with them in democratic or other pol-
itical processes. Political parties will naturally 
compete with each other and must be able to 
offer something to the electorate, beyond the 
mere promise that correct economic strategy 
will eventually benefit everybody. Different sec-
tors of the population have concrete expecta-
tions from the State as protector and arbiter, 
based on its past activities. Doctrinaire dismissal 
of these expectations can result in damaging 
pendular swings between the extremes of the 
interventionist State and the privatizing neolib-
eral State. The activities easiest for a govern-
ment to relinquish are those directed to the 
needs of the least organized and poorest sectors 
of the population. The pursuit of self-limitation 
of the State thus calls for public deliberation on 
the specific issues and the presentation of realis-
tic, socially equitable alternatives for performing 
tasks that the State relinquishes. While pluralist 
democracy can be compatible with many degrees 
and kinds of State intervention, decisions on 
what the State should do cannot rest entirely on 
criteria of efficiency —or, for that matter, of 
equity. It is probably futile to urge a complexly 
stratified society to "make up its mind" as to 
what it wants. 
b) Decentralization 
Transfer of many State responsibilities to 
regional and local elected authorities as well as 
non-governmental organizations and neigh-
bourhood associations is not only desirable but 
also unavoidable in view of dwindling central 
resources and rising demands for regional and 
local autonomy. Here too, however, contradic-
tions appear. Governments naturally want to 
hand over responsibilities and costs while keep-
ing control over what is done locally. The desid-
eratum of sufficient autonomy to permit local 
bodies to gain experience and self-confidence 
through trial and error clashes with the desidera-
tum of national standards for services, State gua-
rantees of rights, and safeguards against the 
capture of local bodies by self-serving cliques and 
caciques. The local bodies will continue to want 
and need subsidies from the State, while the 
State will be reluctant to transfer control even 
over local sources of tax revenue. Contradictions 
such as these persist even in the countries with 
the firmest traditions of pluralist democracy and 
the best institutionalized systems of public 
administration, with continually shifting balan-
ces between centralization and local autonomy, 
subsidies and forced self-reliance, centrally 
enforced standards and local resistance to such 
standards. In maintaining a tolerable balance 
and keeping inequities and inefficiencies within 
limits, the courts, the national legislatures, and 
the mass media are key actors whose interven-
tions make national/local relationships even 
more complex. 
c) Democratic rehabilitation of the bureaucracy 
The capacity to undertake, reform or aban-
don given policies depends, among other things, 
on better understanding of class and group inter-
ests, organizations, ideologies and self-defensive 
tactics of the State's technocratic and bureau-
cratic agents. At present, as was stated above, the 
agents in technocratic and planning roles face 
unprecedented responsibilities yet are deprived 
of their previous confidence in development the-
ories and have to interact with political leader-
ships uncertain whether to treat them as 
saviours or scapegoats. The middle and lower 
strata of public employees have become insecure 
to the point of demoralization. Researches into 
bureaucratic culture warn against excessive 
expectations of making bureaucracies into 
optimal instruments of State policies, but 
governments cannot afford to relinquish the 
pre-crisis advances toward bureaucracies with 
internalized norms, experience and technical 
competence. 
The present problem has two main aspects, 
neither of them susceptible to simple short-term 
solutions: First, the public employees needed by 
the State will have to recover confidence in their 
own roles and at the same time adapt themselves 
to scarcity of resources and to the confiictive 
democratization of the societies. Second, and 
even harder to prescribe for, a high proportion 
of middle-level public employees and aspirants 
to public employment will have to find different 
means of livelihood. Various partial solutions 
can be proposed, such as aid in the establishment 
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of small businesses and retraining for social pro-
grammes to be implemented by the national or 
local governments, but democratic régimes will 
be wrestling with the bulk of the problem as long 
as the economies remain unable to absorb the 
output of the educational systems. Public 
employees are legitimate participants in plural-
ist democracy, with even more acute problems of 
reconciling corporate interests and societal 
interests. than most other groups. Democratic 
political leadership can hope to bring their roles 
into somewhat closer correspondence with the 
interests of society as a whole through dialogue 
with their representatives and through mutual 
awareness that the status quo is not viable. 
d) Financing of the State 
During the earlier stages of expansion of the 
State apparatus and State activities, the neces-
sary financing was achieved partly through 
growth of the export sector and of taxes on 
exports, and partly through internal taxes that 
were relatively easy to collect but generally 
regressive, such as sales taxes. As these sources 
became insufficient and the State's ability to col-
lect taxes deteriorated rather than improved, 
governments resorted increasingly to inflation-
ary practices and then to borrowing abroad. 
Under conditions of depressed internal markets 
previous sources of revenue cannot be increased 
very much: inflation has become one of the main 
sources of popular unrest and government dis-
credit, and substantial borrowing abroad is no 
longer feasible. Therefore, democratic régimes 
must try to achieve whatever level of income 
they require by establishing tax systems that 
bring in more money, are socially equitable, and 
do not unduly inhibit private initiative. For rea-
sons already indicated, this will be a peculiarly 
difficult effort, requiring not only reform of the 
tax laws and an efficient, incorruptible enforce-
ment mechanism, but also achievement of a 
reasonable degree of confidence among the tax-
payers that the State will make good use of the 
revenues it receives. 
e) Foresight and flexibility 
In spite of the many efforts to formulate 
long-term and comprehensive development 
strategies, State actions in Latin America, as 
elsewhere, have remained largely fragmentary 
and reactive —to short-term opportunities as 
well as to crises. The indiscriminate welcoming 
of loan funds from abroad during che 1970s and 
the crisis management policies of the 1980s are 
obvious examples. It is not surprising that the 
participation in policy-making of different sec-
tors of the population has been similarly reac-
tive, to the consequences of State policies or to 
trends outside the control of the State. With 
widely differing ability to make their demands 
heard, each group has resorted to the tactics 
within its reach. Many of these tactics further 
weaken the State's capacity to act coherently: 
curtailment of investments and export of capital 
from one extreme of the social spectrum; gen-
eral strikes, spontaneous uprisings against 
impoverishment, and extreme swings in voting 
patterns from the other. 
Democratic régimes must be prepared, par-
ticularly in times of crisis, to live with a good deal 
of reactive behaviour and respond as best they 
can to demands that cannot be satisfied in the 
short term. Ideally, of course, the State, the polit-
ical parties, the critical intellectuals, and the 
heterogeneous social movements could all 
benefit and reinforce each other in exercising 
more foresight, preventing or providing for 
problems rather than embarking much later on 
costly and generally ineffective remedies, or 
demanding remedies that a long chain of actions 
and failures to act has made the State unable to 
provide. This obviously applies to the questions 
of environmental degradation, destructive land 
settlement, chaotic urbanization, lagging scien-
tific and technological innovation, and many 
others, as well as the problems of indebtedness, 
forced austerity and impoverishment now in the 
forefront of attention. 
Warnings on the future consequences of 
highly visible trends have not been lacking since 
the 1950s. Such warnings could not prevail, how-
ever, in the face of dynamic economic growth, 
struggles to take advantage of that growth, and 
ideological schemes that postponed solution of 
all other problems until after definitive achieve-
ment of development or revolution. Over the 
years, understanding of the problems and their 
interrelationships has certainly become more 
profound and more widely disseminated, but this 
is small comfort. 
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Experience has demonstrated that compre-
hensive development strategies, once they 
enter the political arena, are applied only in part 
—because of differential resistance from groups 
in the private sector and the State apparatus, 
because resources and administrative capacity 
are insufficient to do many things at the same 
time in a co-ordinated way; because political 
leaders find parts of a strategy more attractive 
and likely to mobilize support than others, 
because proponents of some programmes are 
more aggressive and persuasive than others, etc. 
This happened to the structuralist strategies of 
the 1950s and 1960s and also to the later neolib-
eral strategies. It is not a sufficient justification 
for the proponents of a given strategy to argue 
that it would have had better results if it had 
been more consistently applied. Can regimes and 
their interlocutors in the societies find better 
means of exercising foresight without excluding 
"politics" and the uncertainty principle? 
f) Planning 
This brings us to the question of planning. 
The prescriptions for comprehensive, 
rationalistic and reformist development 
planning, which left an abundant heritage of 
national planning bodies and training 
institutions, clearly did not generate sufficient 
foresight, consensus or State capacity to 
influence the future. They have undergone harsh 
evaluations from some of their practitioners as a 
"liturgy . . . with resonance both messianic and 
Utopian". "The voluntarist illusions of planning 
in the service of social change . . . today lack all 
viability". Planners have been advised to fix 
their sights on "harmonizing as far as possible 
the interests and the demands of the social forces 
in conflict, in an effort to reduce uncertainty in 
their future evolution", recognizing that "the 
success (and the viability) of current political 
projects will depend essentially on the degree of 
hegemony of the dominant groups over the 
society as a whole, on the level of compatibility 
of the respective political project with the 
rationality dominant in these systems, and with 
the basic trends dominant in the world economy 
of which they form part" (de Mattos, 1988). 
This position limits planning to diagnostic 
and educational functions at the service of the 
State, with modest pretensions to rationalize 
conflicts, evaluate the efforts of social actors to 
bring questions to the attention of governments, 
and propose relevant reforms. This is certainly 
more realistic than the conception of planning as 
a means of transforming State policy through 
the application of esoteric tools while evading 
the question of power, but it does not confront 
the sorry consequences of the dominant 
rationality and the doubtful compatibility with 
national interests of the trends dominant in the 
world economy. The major value of present 
planning bodies to democratic régimes might lie 
in their installed capacity for research, criticism 
of conventional wisdom, and generation of 
heterodox proposals for coping with dominant 
trends. In any case, conformist planning at the 
service of the State should interact with counter-
planning by intellectuals outside the State 
apparatus —uncommitted to the prevailing 
hegemony and uninhibited in trying to act as 
agents of social change— as well as planning at 
the service of the political parties and other 
movements. Education in planning, for all its 
illusions, has helped to produce a body of 
candidates qualified for these roles. 
In this sense, planning merges into the 
debates and researches over political systems 
and styles of development (or alternatives to 
"development') that have been under way since 
the 1960s and that are now reviving cautiously 
after a period of eclipse. The earlier proposals 
refused to accept the inevitability of the repro-
duction in Latin America of the "consumer 
society" of the advanced capitalist countries, on 
the one hand, or the "real Socialist" model on the 
other. They expressed a confidence in the poten-
tialities of autonomous choice at the national 
level and "de-linking" from the world economic 
order that later events have dissipated. They 
undoubtedly combined a "liturgy" of techno-
cratic utopianism with participatory and equalit-
arian ideals. Many factors have since made it 
harder to think about choices for the long-term 
future. However, if pluralist democracies are to 
be altogether subject to the economic Kingdom 
of Necessity, why should people participate and 
defend them? Four questions, in particular, 
argue against agnosticism toward the long-term 
future. In relation to ail four questions, govern-
ments and social movements are undertaking 
SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s / M. Wolfe 67 
necessary initiatives in spite of the crisis, but are 
quite aware of the wide gap between these piece-
meal initiatives and convincing answers: 
— The environmental question: Are present 
trends of resource use and industrialization 
really viable and compatible with human survi-
val over the long term? If not, how can they be 
transformed and what agents can undertake to 
direct the transformation? 
— The equity question: If the patterns of 
distribution —the juxtaposition of extreme 
wealth and extreme poverty-- are ethically 
intolerable as well as inhibiting to development, 
as governments and peoples have affirmed for 
years, what can be done to change them, how far, 
and by whom? Why does distribution in Latin 
America continue to be more inequitable than in 
other world regions in spite of the rhetoric and 
the proliferation of programmes? 
— The meaningful activity question: If even 
the most optimistic production and employment 
projections do not offer hope of incorporating a 
large part of the continually growing labour 
force, and if modernization processes and con-
siderations of economic efficiency set limits to 
employment expansion, how can the "superflu-
ous" part of the population find livelihood and 
bases for a sense of belonging to and participat-
ing in the social order? Can a conception of 
"meaningful activity for all" replace "full 
employment" as a long-term objective? 
— The cultural question: Should the 
societies of Latin America accept as inevitable 
the cultural homogenization diffused from the 
central consumer societies? If not, how can they 
affirm their own cultural identity and enrich 
their internal cultural diversity while respecting 
the free choices of their people and the necessary 
active participation in world cultural and 
technological advances? 
Debates on such questions are inherently 
conflictive. They may generate greater realism 
and mutual understanding, but never full con-
sensus. Their terms are bound to change as the 
settings change, eliminating some possibilities 
and opening others. For the present, what can be 
hoped for is that the debates will continue and 
draw in the general public, with innovativeness 
and time horizons beyond the limits imposed by 
crisis management. 
The ideal of "participatory planning", 
involving the State in dialogue with the whole 
range of collective social actors and leading to 
social pacts enjoying broad consensus, deserves 
support tempered by realism. The extent to 
which the contending forces can really derive 
coherent projects from such initiatives, and the 
extent to which the interlocutors can commit 
their supposed followings remain questionable, 
particularly as long as the discussion has to cen-
tre on the sharing of sacrifices without any assu-
rances that the sacrifices will really be rewarded. 
These initiatives, like the earlier conceptions of 
planning, risk becoming ritualistic means of 
postponing difficult choices and responses to 
group pressures, with concrete proposals for 
State action emerging only after they have 
ceased to be politically or economically viable. 
Nevertheless, the efforts cannot be abandoned. 
They have an important educational function, as 
long as they direct their sights beyond the short 
term, even if the social pacts rarely maintain 
themselves for very long. 
Participatory planning and social pacts sup-
pose the formation and effective functioning of 
consultative bodies supplementing representa-
tion through political parties and legislatures. 
Such mechanisms should help to reveal the full 
implications of given policies and the strengths 
of the backing and resistance they will encoun-
ter. They should help to bring out into the open 
pressures and tactics for influencing policy that 
would be present in any case. The obvious draw-
backs lie in the unequal capacity of different 
groups to formulate and represent common 
interests, and in the likelihood of new manifesta-
tions of policy segmentation, as different organ-
ized interests consult with different components 
of the State apparatus to shape the policies that 
affect them most directly. 
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